Washington, (Samajweekly) The US’ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has recently obtained a substantial number of new documents from a confidential source containing detailed allegations relating to funds that were transferred out of the war-torn nation before the collapse of the Ashraf Ghani government.
This investigation is in its preliminary stages, but the documents indicate that tens of millions of dollars in cash and gold bullion may have been illicitly spirited out of the country through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other neighbouring countries.
There are allegations that these transfers were orchestrated by or on behalf of influential people, including then-current or former members of the Afghan government, John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, said in a recent testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Accountability of the US House of Representatives.
While the former Donald Trump administration’s decision to sign the Doha Agreement and the Joe Biden administration’s decision to follow through with the withdrawal were immediate factors precipitating the collapse of the Ghani-led Afghan government and its security forces, those decisions had antecedents that stretched to the beginning of the mission in 2001, he said.
SIGAR is working to to identify former Afghan government officials, politically connected individuals, and others involved in suspicious transactions, and identify high value real estate purchased by such individuals in the US or abroad for potential connection to flight of capital and potential seizure.
This data may also indicate Afghan financial institutions and other entities which may have been involved in the diversion of funds.
In another initiative, SIGAR is working with a contractor to obtain open-source intelligence from countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Turkey which was previously unavailable to it. That information will be compared to the wire transfer data obtained above to identify individuals, entities, and shell corporations used by former Afghan government officials or politically connected individuals which may have benefited from the theft of funds or flight of capital from Afghanistan.
As a result of extensive investigation and working with other law enforcement agencies, SIGAR has nominated a prominent Afghan former official for sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
The subject has an extensive history of involvement in government contract fraud and has a suspected business relationship with a sanctioned high-level Russian official.
SIGAR said conditions that aided Taliban’s return to power were decades in the making.
Many of the underlying problems that contributed to the Afghan government’s ultimate demise had been present for years, and long predated the administrations of both Presidents Trump and Biden.
The report said the strategy to achieve US objectives in Afghanistan kept changing, the US government consistently underestimated the time required to rebuild Afghanistan and created unrealistic timelines that prioritised spending quickly. The resulting influx of money increased corruption and reduced the effectiveness of programmes.
Many of the institutions and infrastructure projects the US built were not sustainable. Civilian and military personnel policies and practices were counterproductive, thwarting the overall effort.
Persistent insecurity severely undermined efforts. The US government did not understand the Afghan context and failed to tailor its efforts accordingly. US agencies rarely conducted sufficient monitoring and evaluation to understand the impact of their efforts.
The Afghan government’s high level of centralisation and endemic corruption undermined Its legitimacy, the report said.
“These factors, some of which dated to the very beginning of the US reconstruction effort – and none of which were overcome despite ample warning by SIGAR and others — created the conditions by which more recent precipitating factors acted as accelerants that ultimately led to the collapse of Afghanistan’s civilian government and its military forces. But make no mistake, the tragic events of August 2021 have their roots in decisions that were made by policymakers, diplomats, aid officials, and military leaders decades earlier,” SIGAR said.
The collapse of the Afghan government still, to the surprise of many, took less than 4 months. SIGAR identified five shorter-term factors contributing to it.
A history of US vacillation on the issue of withdrawal led Afghan government officials to believe that the US was not serious about leaving. Despite many official pronouncements throughout the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations about the US desire to exit Afghanistan, contradictory messaging by US officials failed to convey the seriousness of US intentions.
The Afghan government was fundamentally unprepared to manage the fight against the Taliban as the US military and its contractors withdrew. “The (Afghan) government seems to have been caught in a surreal bubble,” the Afghanistan Analysts Network reported on the day of the collapse. “While the Taliban were advancing, senior government officials were still releasing statements about donor-driven ceremonies and meetings.”
Both governments share the blame, SIGAR said. Afghan government officials often focused on personal gain at the country’s expense; it was a country with more takers than leaders. For 20 years, the Afghan government seldom exhibited an ability to prepare for anything of consequence to begin with-not elections, not social services, and not the rule of law.
For its part, the US lacked a long-term, consistent strategy, as well as the doctrines, policies, and resources needed to create another nation’s army almost from scratch. The US’ persistent desire to get out of Afghanistan resulted in the US military working to create the appearance of success by performing the tasks it was supposed to be training the Afghan military to do.
The White House recently released a after-action review of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and reached the conclusion that any problems were the fault of the Trump administration, Defense One reported.
When President Trump took office, there were 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. Trump “emboldened” the Taliban by meeting with them at Camp David and entering into an agreement to pull troops out and free more than 5,000 Taliban fighters from prison, which put Biden in an impossible position. Biden’s choices were “severely constrained by conditions created by his predecessor”, it reads.
